2011 08 12
Just a few days into the second year of Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos’ administration, his popularity rate remains among the highest in the region, despite ongoing security challenges that could surface in a variety of ugly ways leading up to the October local elections. In August 2010, the Santos administration brought an unprecedented level of continuity from the previous eight years of former President Uribe’s Democratic Security strategy, tweaking the security strategy in name - from security to consolidation - and focus - from insurgency to criminal bands. Under the title of Democratic Consolidation, Santos’ strategy has focused on consolidating state power in formerly volatile areas of the Colombian countryside, where his predecessor performed a clear and hold operation, followed by an injection of government services. Before these pockets of state presence collapsed, Santos’ plan sought to consolidate the state’s presence in the zones through the further pruning of criminal activities.
As ever, the FARC remains a constant target and the hunt for FARC leadership draws significant military and intelligence resources. In response, the FARC have increased their attacks over the past year, and Santos has been forced to defend his strategy against criticism in the media and even by the former government about his handling of the security situation. He needs to show results on the FARC operations to maintain high approval ratings.
However, even as the FARC receive significant attention, the government has also placed increasing offensive focus on criminal bands such as Los Rastrojos, Urabeños, and Paisas, which they recognize as a group that collectively threatens to erode the security gains made under Uribe faster than the FARC.
Through a series of operations, dubbed alternatively in Colombian press as Operation Troy and Plan Troy, these offensive pushes into the Caribbean (February 2011), Pacific (May 2011) and - in two weeks - Choco (30 August 2011) regions of Colombia have so far netted mixed results. The government is quick to tout statistics in the drop of homicides and the names and faces of so-called cabecillas of the Rastrojos, Urabeños and others. But as Southern Pulse has previously reported, an atomization strategy that focuses on removing criminal leaders provokes an increase in volatility not security. The most recent high-ranking Rastrojos commander to fall was, Angel “Sebastian” de Jesus Pacheco, who was killed on 25 July in a municipality of northern Antioquia by his own bodyguards. Their motive remains unclear, though the results are clear: Pacheco’s death opens space for other leaders to try to fill, and could lead to an increase in violence as rival groups try to fill the power vacuum. The resulting violence, as others have concluded, is just one example of how many of the areas targeted for consolidation have moved in the opposite direction; they are more violent under an increase in state presence.
The most recent Plan Troy announcement, made earlier this month, will focus on Choco and the regions of Colombia where the federal government is most concerned about election-related violence. This likely will include an increased presence in the region of Bajo Cauca, formed by six nothern municipalities in the Cauca River valley of Antioquia department. This zone is a critical path for drug trafficking through Colombia, and control of this plaza - to borrow the Mexican term - has concentrated a variety of groups all struggling for control, including the FARC, the Rastrojos, and the Urabeños.
As the government continues to net arrests of low-level operators, kill or arrest mid-level commanders, or force internal disputes (a possible explanation for Pacheco’s death), the rules of atomization are likely to play out in Colombia, as they have played out most recently in the Mexican states of Jalisco and Michoacan. A strategy that pursues this path works only if the government removes leaders faster than the groups are able to reconstitute themselves. Indeed, in Colombia, with the exception of the FARC’s highest commanders, the life cycle of criminal leaders is significantly shorter than that of leaders in Mexico. While the so-called kingpin strategy is problematic in Mexico, taking out high and mid-level leadership has traction in Colombia. Swift action on criminal leaders relies heavily on professional security forces and human intelligence networks.
Colombian Defense Minister Rodrigo Rivera recently announced that the government would triple the size of the military intelligence group, and coordinate intelligence collection, sharing, and action across various military groups through the recently dubbed Intelligence Fusion Center. Rivera also plans to double the size of the national police intelligence collection operation. Both efforts will likely prove to be good investments as the Santos administration moves forward with a multi-pronged approach to consolidating state presence while combating various and disparate groups. Yet while Colombia is strong on the offensive and intelligence side of operations, it is woefully lacking in follow through.
The country’s judicial system remains one of the greatest impediments to completing a cycle of investigation, arrest, trial, and imprisonment or extortion that continues to count an impunity rate hovering at 90%. Other internal challenges include collusion between local politician and criminal bands, whether under duress or not, and cooperation between members of the police and military, and criminal bands. When 20 members of Los Rastrojos were arrested on 4 August 2011, seven of the accused were active duty policemen; three were military soldiers. Pacheco allegedly paid the men just over US$1,000 a month for their protection services.
The collusion between the FARC and criminal bands is another concern. Even as they compete over territory and routes in some areas, the ties that bind these groups facilitate business and logically the strength of these groups, who work together in 11 of Colombia’s 32 departments. Fighting between criminal groups is bloody but weakens them, allowing government forces to pick-off the survivors while they are still weak. The links between Colombia’s domestic criminal groups is necessary for business, driven largely by the Mexican criminal system - rooted in Colombia to ensure resource security.
A separate external factor is a decline in US government aid and focus for military training and support in Colombia. Washington’s focus has arguably shifted north to Mexico, where the front lines of its drug war have been drawn congruent to the US-Mexico border line.
Marching into his second year in office, President Santos must keep careful aim on several moving targets. He must maintain equal pressure on criminal bands and the country’s insurgent groups in several pockets across the country while disallowing displacement into Colombia’s neighbors and preventing the advance of Mexican criminals into his country. And that’s just his security challenge, apart from economy, judiciary, and ongoing corruption scandals hungover from Uribe’s administration. In October, we will have another opportunity to review his national security strategy. So far, the potential for violence across the country in two months does not point to a promising future for thousands of Santos’ countrymen who must live under the control of criminal groups. Nor would peace, as it is a Latin American hallmark of absolute criminal control and a thriving criminal business enterprise.
As ever, the FARC remains a constant target and the hunt for FARC leadership draws significant military and intelligence resources. In response, the FARC have increased their attacks over the past year, and Santos has been forced to defend his strategy against criticism in the media and even by the former government about his handling of the security situation. He needs to show results on the FARC operations to maintain high approval ratings.
However, even as the FARC receive significant attention, the government has also placed increasing offensive focus on criminal bands such as Los Rastrojos, Urabeños, and Paisas, which they recognize as a group that collectively threatens to erode the security gains made under Uribe faster than the FARC.
Through a series of operations, dubbed alternatively in Colombian press as Operation Troy and Plan Troy, these offensive pushes into the Caribbean (February 2011), Pacific (May 2011) and - in two weeks - Choco (30 August 2011) regions of Colombia have so far netted mixed results. The government is quick to tout statistics in the drop of homicides and the names and faces of so-called cabecillas of the Rastrojos, Urabeños and others. But as Southern Pulse has previously reported, an atomization strategy that focuses on removing criminal leaders provokes an increase in volatility not security. The most recent high-ranking Rastrojos commander to fall was, Angel “Sebastian” de Jesus Pacheco, who was killed on 25 July in a municipality of northern Antioquia by his own bodyguards. Their motive remains unclear, though the results are clear: Pacheco’s death opens space for other leaders to try to fill, and could lead to an increase in violence as rival groups try to fill the power vacuum. The resulting violence, as others have concluded, is just one example of how many of the areas targeted for consolidation have moved in the opposite direction; they are more violent under an increase in state presence.
The most recent Plan Troy announcement, made earlier this month, will focus on Choco and the regions of Colombia where the federal government is most concerned about election-related violence. This likely will include an increased presence in the region of Bajo Cauca, formed by six nothern municipalities in the Cauca River valley of Antioquia department. This zone is a critical path for drug trafficking through Colombia, and control of this plaza - to borrow the Mexican term - has concentrated a variety of groups all struggling for control, including the FARC, the Rastrojos, and the Urabeños.
As the government continues to net arrests of low-level operators, kill or arrest mid-level commanders, or force internal disputes (a possible explanation for Pacheco’s death), the rules of atomization are likely to play out in Colombia, as they have played out most recently in the Mexican states of Jalisco and Michoacan. A strategy that pursues this path works only if the government removes leaders faster than the groups are able to reconstitute themselves. Indeed, in Colombia, with the exception of the FARC’s highest commanders, the life cycle of criminal leaders is significantly shorter than that of leaders in Mexico. While the so-called kingpin strategy is problematic in Mexico, taking out high and mid-level leadership has traction in Colombia. Swift action on criminal leaders relies heavily on professional security forces and human intelligence networks.
Colombian Defense Minister Rodrigo Rivera recently announced that the government would triple the size of the military intelligence group, and coordinate intelligence collection, sharing, and action across various military groups through the recently dubbed Intelligence Fusion Center. Rivera also plans to double the size of the national police intelligence collection operation. Both efforts will likely prove to be good investments as the Santos administration moves forward with a multi-pronged approach to consolidating state presence while combating various and disparate groups. Yet while Colombia is strong on the offensive and intelligence side of operations, it is woefully lacking in follow through.
The country’s judicial system remains one of the greatest impediments to completing a cycle of investigation, arrest, trial, and imprisonment or extortion that continues to count an impunity rate hovering at 90%. Other internal challenges include collusion between local politician and criminal bands, whether under duress or not, and cooperation between members of the police and military, and criminal bands. When 20 members of Los Rastrojos were arrested on 4 August 2011, seven of the accused were active duty policemen; three were military soldiers. Pacheco allegedly paid the men just over US$1,000 a month for their protection services.
The collusion between the FARC and criminal bands is another concern. Even as they compete over territory and routes in some areas, the ties that bind these groups facilitate business and logically the strength of these groups, who work together in 11 of Colombia’s 32 departments. Fighting between criminal groups is bloody but weakens them, allowing government forces to pick-off the survivors while they are still weak. The links between Colombia’s domestic criminal groups is necessary for business, driven largely by the Mexican criminal system - rooted in Colombia to ensure resource security.
A separate external factor is a decline in US government aid and focus for military training and support in Colombia. Washington’s focus has arguably shifted north to Mexico, where the front lines of its drug war have been drawn congruent to the US-Mexico border line.
Marching into his second year in office, President Santos must keep careful aim on several moving targets. He must maintain equal pressure on criminal bands and the country’s insurgent groups in several pockets across the country while disallowing displacement into Colombia’s neighbors and preventing the advance of Mexican criminals into his country. And that’s just his security challenge, apart from economy, judiciary, and ongoing corruption scandals hungover from Uribe’s administration. In October, we will have another opportunity to review his national security strategy. So far, the potential for violence across the country in two months does not point to a promising future for thousands of Santos’ countrymen who must live under the control of criminal groups. Nor would peace, as it is a Latin American hallmark of absolute criminal control and a thriving criminal business enterprise.
Source: http://southernpulse.com/_webapp_3949844/Taking_Measure_of_Santos%27_Consolidation_Strategy
