2011 08 12
Already facing multiple corruption scandals, the resignation of two ministers and the arrests or investigations into various other officials, Brazil President Rousseff was forced to fire her minister of defense, Nelson Jobim, last week due to various political comments he made in the media. His replacement, Celso Amorim, may be a major shift in this key ministerial post.
Jobim was already under intense media criticism after comments in the media hinted he believed those around him were idiots. He also claimed he voted for Rousseff’s opponent in last year’s presidential election. While voting for Jose Serra was not a disqualification for serving in the Rousseff administration (some may argue it helps show her as tolerant of diverse political views), it came across as a subtle criticism of the president’s agenda that was already under fire in the media.
The last straws were two media reports in mid-August 2011 in which Jobim was quoted as calling one cabinet minister a “little weakling” and claiming Rousseff’s new choice for chief of staff “doesn’t even know Brasilia.” The first comment was a leak and Jobim denies making the second comment, but coming on the heels of his other recent foot-in-mouth statements, it pushed Dilma to act.
Unlike the other two cabinet ministers forced from office, Jobim was not someone clearly in the Lula camp. He is a member of the PMDB and served as minister of justice under President Cardoso in the mid-1990’s. Even as he served in the Lula government, he almost always appeared to be more conservative than others in the cabinet. He had even appeared initially reluctant to take the position in the Rousseff administration.
As minister, Jobim was one of the most influential cabinet members in both administrations and as he exits public service leaves a significant legacy in terms civilian leadership of the Brazilian military. The Defense Ministry under Jobim made significant progress on updating its strategy and modernizing the force. It made a push on procurement of modern weapons; faced the greatest single day loss of troops since World War Two in the January 2010 earthquake in Haiti and then maintained leadership of that peacekeeping force through the tough post-quake rescue, recovery and reconstruction period; began urban combat operations in Rio to take back favelas ahead of the World Cup and Olympics; and, expanded rural operations along the borders to combat illicit trafficking by criminal organizations. Jobim also shaped the South American Defense Council into an organization with the potential to bring regional military leaders together under Brazil’s leadership.
The naming of Lula’s Foreign Minister and well-known leftist political battle axe Celso Amorim to replace Jobim breaks the recent trend of Rousseff pushing out key figures from her predecessor’s administration. Amorim is clearly an ally of Lula, more so than Jobim. His appointment also brings in a seasoned political veteran into an administration that had been recently criticized for having too many political neophytes in place to manage relations with Congress and the other political parties.
Despite his veteran status, Amorim’s appointment is not going over well with a military already hesitant about President Rousseff. One anonymous military officer was quoted by Folha de Sao Paulo and Reuters as saying, “Since when do diplomats care about war? It's like sending a doctor to take care of a morgue.” There was also a protest by military spouses over low pay and poor equipment. Jobim was generally able to play a good middle ground between the military and the government looking to prosecute dictatorship-era abuses. There are concerns among officers that Amorim will not stick up for the military during the inter-agency battles to come.
Upon taking the defense minister position, one of the first announcements made by Amorim is that he is considering pulling Brazil out of the MINUSTAH UN peacekeeping mission in Haiti. This would be a huge blow to the UN presence in Haiti and could trigger a series of withdrawals by other Latin American governments, who are necessary for the force structure as well as its image of legitimacy. While Jobim had defended the Brazilian military presence in Haiti, several left-wing politicians in the Congress have repeatedly criticized the mission and demanded withdrawal. The Brazilian public isn’t significantly in favor of or against the mission and there aren’t many champions for the mission, even within the Brazilian military, so it’s a safe stand for Amorim to take to signify a change without angering any political stakeholders.
Whatever his knowledge of military affairs, Amorim is certain to easily settle into the political and foreign relations aspects of the defense minister position. That will have both positive and negative effects for the region. On the positive side, Amorim could serve as an important moderating force for some of the militaries who are becoming too politically involved in their countries, including Bolivia and Venezuela. On the negative side, Amorim is likely to see the South American Defense Council as primarily a political tool rather than as an institution for military to military cooperation, which would be a loss for the growth of UNASUR.
On procurement issues, Amorim’s new position may push the US and Brazil further apart. While Jobim was open to the Boeing F/A-18 bid and Rousseff has even indicated she may support the US planes if the bid continues, Amorim was among those in the Lula administration strongest against going with the US jets and in favor of the French Rafale. Meanwhile, Amorim’s political leanings are going to provide ammunition to those in the US who oppose giving Embraer military contracts.
As an immediate challenge to Amorim, a top Brazilian general was implicated in fraudulent contracts according to an investigation by regional media including Folha de Sao Paulo and the Argentine newspaper Pagina 12. General Enzo Martins Peri, the commander of Brazil’s Army, is one of eight military officers linked to 88 fraudulent contracts worth over US$7 million.
Upon choosing Amorim, President Rousseff said that she was sure he would be a quick learner on military strategy and defense issues. The military is concerned that the president just placed an opponent as their civilian leader. Yet, in spite of the concerns, Amorim’s early statements indicate he wants a Brazilian military that needs the equipment and training to defend Brazil’s sovereign territory. The former diplomat may yet find common ground with the military leadership on those issues, and other core issues, including the protection of the so-called Blue Amazon, or Brazil’s oceanic territory. Still, Amorim’s contentious nature and highly-trained verbal swordsmanship may not serve as the best match, and an indication of Dilma’s limited range of options and insight into her government’s structure and culture beyond the executive office.
Jobim was already under intense media criticism after comments in the media hinted he believed those around him were idiots. He also claimed he voted for Rousseff’s opponent in last year’s presidential election. While voting for Jose Serra was not a disqualification for serving in the Rousseff administration (some may argue it helps show her as tolerant of diverse political views), it came across as a subtle criticism of the president’s agenda that was already under fire in the media.
The last straws were two media reports in mid-August 2011 in which Jobim was quoted as calling one cabinet minister a “little weakling” and claiming Rousseff’s new choice for chief of staff “doesn’t even know Brasilia.” The first comment was a leak and Jobim denies making the second comment, but coming on the heels of his other recent foot-in-mouth statements, it pushed Dilma to act.
Unlike the other two cabinet ministers forced from office, Jobim was not someone clearly in the Lula camp. He is a member of the PMDB and served as minister of justice under President Cardoso in the mid-1990’s. Even as he served in the Lula government, he almost always appeared to be more conservative than others in the cabinet. He had even appeared initially reluctant to take the position in the Rousseff administration.
As minister, Jobim was one of the most influential cabinet members in both administrations and as he exits public service leaves a significant legacy in terms civilian leadership of the Brazilian military. The Defense Ministry under Jobim made significant progress on updating its strategy and modernizing the force. It made a push on procurement of modern weapons; faced the greatest single day loss of troops since World War Two in the January 2010 earthquake in Haiti and then maintained leadership of that peacekeeping force through the tough post-quake rescue, recovery and reconstruction period; began urban combat operations in Rio to take back favelas ahead of the World Cup and Olympics; and, expanded rural operations along the borders to combat illicit trafficking by criminal organizations. Jobim also shaped the South American Defense Council into an organization with the potential to bring regional military leaders together under Brazil’s leadership.
The naming of Lula’s Foreign Minister and well-known leftist political battle axe Celso Amorim to replace Jobim breaks the recent trend of Rousseff pushing out key figures from her predecessor’s administration. Amorim is clearly an ally of Lula, more so than Jobim. His appointment also brings in a seasoned political veteran into an administration that had been recently criticized for having too many political neophytes in place to manage relations with Congress and the other political parties.
Despite his veteran status, Amorim’s appointment is not going over well with a military already hesitant about President Rousseff. One anonymous military officer was quoted by Folha de Sao Paulo and Reuters as saying, “Since when do diplomats care about war? It's like sending a doctor to take care of a morgue.” There was also a protest by military spouses over low pay and poor equipment. Jobim was generally able to play a good middle ground between the military and the government looking to prosecute dictatorship-era abuses. There are concerns among officers that Amorim will not stick up for the military during the inter-agency battles to come.
Upon taking the defense minister position, one of the first announcements made by Amorim is that he is considering pulling Brazil out of the MINUSTAH UN peacekeeping mission in Haiti. This would be a huge blow to the UN presence in Haiti and could trigger a series of withdrawals by other Latin American governments, who are necessary for the force structure as well as its image of legitimacy. While Jobim had defended the Brazilian military presence in Haiti, several left-wing politicians in the Congress have repeatedly criticized the mission and demanded withdrawal. The Brazilian public isn’t significantly in favor of or against the mission and there aren’t many champions for the mission, even within the Brazilian military, so it’s a safe stand for Amorim to take to signify a change without angering any political stakeholders.
Whatever his knowledge of military affairs, Amorim is certain to easily settle into the political and foreign relations aspects of the defense minister position. That will have both positive and negative effects for the region. On the positive side, Amorim could serve as an important moderating force for some of the militaries who are becoming too politically involved in their countries, including Bolivia and Venezuela. On the negative side, Amorim is likely to see the South American Defense Council as primarily a political tool rather than as an institution for military to military cooperation, which would be a loss for the growth of UNASUR.
On procurement issues, Amorim’s new position may push the US and Brazil further apart. While Jobim was open to the Boeing F/A-18 bid and Rousseff has even indicated she may support the US planes if the bid continues, Amorim was among those in the Lula administration strongest against going with the US jets and in favor of the French Rafale. Meanwhile, Amorim’s political leanings are going to provide ammunition to those in the US who oppose giving Embraer military contracts.
As an immediate challenge to Amorim, a top Brazilian general was implicated in fraudulent contracts according to an investigation by regional media including Folha de Sao Paulo and the Argentine newspaper Pagina 12. General Enzo Martins Peri, the commander of Brazil’s Army, is one of eight military officers linked to 88 fraudulent contracts worth over US$7 million.
Upon choosing Amorim, President Rousseff said that she was sure he would be a quick learner on military strategy and defense issues. The military is concerned that the president just placed an opponent as their civilian leader. Yet, in spite of the concerns, Amorim’s early statements indicate he wants a Brazilian military that needs the equipment and training to defend Brazil’s sovereign territory. The former diplomat may yet find common ground with the military leadership on those issues, and other core issues, including the protection of the so-called Blue Amazon, or Brazil’s oceanic territory. Still, Amorim’s contentious nature and highly-trained verbal swordsmanship may not serve as the best match, and an indication of Dilma’s limited range of options and insight into her government’s structure and culture beyond the executive office.
Source: http://southernpulse.com/_webapp_3949841/Amorim_Takes_Over_as_Defense_Minister_Amid_Concern
